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THE SUBSIDIRITY PRINCIPLE IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW -
AMERICAN FEDERALISM COMPARED
W. Gary Vause"
I. INTRODUCTION
More than 200 years ago, the draftsmen of the U.S. Constitution
struggled with an enduring dilemma for modem nations now contemplat-
ing new political structures for the combination of autonomous states:
what form shall the new government take, and if that structure is to be
federal, what shall be the proper allocation of power between the states
and the federal government?
Although the fundamental structure of American federalism is in
place, the work refining the balance between state and federal power is
an on-going process. The Republican Party victory in 1994, gaining
majority control of both houses of Congress, virtually assures that new
legislative measures will be passed to reallocate some powers to state and
local governments. Among the most controversial areas of dispute likely
will be those programs involving social benefits
Social policy has emerged as one of the most important elements in
the European Union (EU)2 legal system. The preamble to the European
Economic Community Treaty (EC Treaty) expressly refers to the impor-
" Professor of Law and Director, Center for Dispute Resolution, Stetson University
College of Law. This essay is based on a lecture given by the author in May 1994 at
the Katholieke Universiteit Brabant in the Netherlands. The author acknowledges with
appreciation the research assistance of Richard L. Ruth, Stetson University College of
Law class of December, 1994.
The new Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, and Senator Bob Dole, the
Republican National Chairman, focused on the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion when they met with Republican governors in early 1995 to discuss legislative
goals. Jerry Gray, Welfare - G.O.P. Governors Make Their Pitch, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7,
1995, at A8.
2 On November 1, 1993, the twelve Member States of what was known as the
European Economic Community approved the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
(TEU), creating the European Union (EU). TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [TEU] 1992
O.J. (C224) 1. See also European Union, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at 15.
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tance of social goals:
[D]etermined to lay the foundations of an even closer union among the
peoples of Europe; Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress
of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which
divide Europe; Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the
constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their
peoples?
Moreover, Article 2 of the EC Treaty, which sets forth the goals of
the common market, includes among those goals "an accelerated raising
of the standard of living,"4 which obviously incorporates both social and
economic elements. The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers (Social Charter),5 which was adopted by all the Mem-
ber States except the U.K. at the European Council meeting in Strasbourg
on December 9-10, 1989,6 has provided an even greater stimulus to
progress in social action. As the European Community (EC) has increased
its activism in such sensitive areas as social policy, some Member States
have been particularly concerned that the new central government might
tread on their local prerogatives.
The principle of "subsidiarity" in EU law requires that action to ac-
complish a legitimate government objective should in principle be taken
at the lowest level of government which is capable of effectively ad-
dressing the problem.7 In effect, subsidiarity is a guideline for contempo-
rary power-sharing between the relatively new institutions of the EU and
the constituent Member States that formed the Union.
This essay examines the notion of subsidiarity in the EU, comparing
it to the American brand of federalism. Although the analogy is justified,
it is clear that subsidiarity does not have an exact counterpart in the
American system of federalism. Nevertheless, the underlying concern over
the division of powers is essentially the same under both systems of
government.
Most of the difficulties to be encountered in applying and interpret-
ing the notion of subsidiarity remain yet unmet and thus are destined for
I TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIc COMMUNITY [EC TREATY]
Preamble.
4 Id. at art. 2.
n The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 3
C.M.L.R. 642 (1989).
6 Commission of the European Communities, XXIIIrd General Report of the Ac-
tivities of the European Communities - 1989, 187-88 (1990).
7 TONY VENABLES & DAVID MARTIN, AMENDMENT OF THE TREATIES 24 (1992).
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future resolution. Perhaps some useful guidance can be obtained by
analyzing the long history of America's experience in reconciling the
divergent interests which intersect at the juncture of federal and state
powers. Following an examination of the subsidiary principle in Part II,
Part III will review American federalism with that objective in mind.
II. THE SUBSIDIARJTY PRINCIPLE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE EU
The notion of subsidiarity originated in ancient times and was first
applied within the Roman Catholic Church.' In the context of religious
philosophy, the concept of subsidiarity referred to the relationship between
government and private enterprise.9
In the EC, subsidiarity came to be known as a method of power-
sharing between the central governing institutions and the governing
bodies of the Member States. The principle was first mentioned in the EC
in 1975 as part of the European Commission's Report on Economic
Union.'0 Although the subsidiarity principle was not mentioned by name,
the report advocated an expansion of Community powers only where
Member States could not effectively accomplish the desired tasks.1' The
theme of the Report was that individual Member State action and Com-
munity action should complement each other, rather than compete with
each other.'2
In 1984, the draft treaty on European Union (Draft Treaty) 3 was
adopted by the European Parliament as a proposal for Community reform.
For the first time, the subsidiarity principle was expressly mentioned as
8 13 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 762 (1967).
The Papal Encyclical of 1931, "Quadregesimo Anno," discussed the concept of
subsidiarity in general:
[J]ust as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group what
private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so it is an injustice, a grave evil and a
disturbance of right order, for a larger and higher association to arrogate to itself
functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies. This is a
fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very
nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body,
but never to destroy or absorb them.
Editorial Comments, The Subsidiarity Principle, 27 COMMON Micr. L. REv. 181, 182
(1990) [hereinafter The Subsidiarity Principle].
10 Supp. 5/75, Bull. EC
" Deborah Z. Cass, The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity
and the Division of Powers Within the European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1107, 1110-11 (1992).
12 Id. at 1114.
'3 See Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33, 53-4
[hereinafter Draft Treaty].
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a general constitutional rule. 4 Paragraph 9 of the Preamble stated: "In-
tending to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, only with those powers required to complete successfully
the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting
independently."'"
Furthermore, the Draft Treaty clarified the practical effect of the
subsidiarity principle on Community action: "The Union shall only act to
carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in
common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those
whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or
effects extend beyond national frontiers."' 6
The Draft Treaty was too ambitious for the Member States to ap-
prove. 7 As a result, the Member States agreed to the Single European
Act (SEA)" as a more modest means of reform. The SEA promoted the
principle of subsidiarity only in the area of environmental protection,
amending the EC Treaty by adding the following proviso: "The Com-
munity shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to
which the objectives can be attained better at Community than at the
level of the individual Member States."' 9
Thus, the SEA gave new powers to Community institutions to
protect the environment, using the principle of subsidiarity as a guideline
for the exercise of that power. However, the SEA granted additional
powers in other potentially controversial areas such as worker health and
safety, regional development and research and technology, with no corre-
sponding link to subsidiarity.' Additionally, it was widely expected that
new treaty amendments concerning economic and monetary union would
be forthcoming.2' The fact that the SEA did very little to promote
subsidiarity as a principle of general application concerned many Member
States because of the growing expansiveness of Community jurisdiction.
This concern was exacerbated by the SEA innovation of qualified majori-
ty voting, in place of unanimity, which allowed a Commission proposal
to become Council legislation despite the opposition of some Member
"4 George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 332, 340-44 (1992) [hereinafter
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously].
'" Draft Treaty, supra note 13, Preamble Para. 9, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33.
16 Id.
'7 Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 344.
Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
'9 EC T EATY art. 130r(4) (as amended 1987).
'o Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 345.
21 Id.
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States.
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)' further
expanded EU jurisdiction, but simultaneously helped quell the fears of
Member States by adopting subsidiarity as a central constitutional princi-
ple of broad application.' Community institutions are instructed to
"respect... the principle of subsidiarity" as they carry out their respon-
sibilities.' The TEU is replete with other references, both direct and
indirect, to the subsidiarity principle. For example, the TEU states that in
the new EU, "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citi-
zens."' The TEU defines subsidiarity by adding the following new
paragraph to the EC Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Com-
munity shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.'
Finally, the TEU amended the EC Treaty in virtually every area
where powers were conferred upon the Community's governing institu-
tions by adding language incorporating the subsidiarity principle.27
The subsidiarity principle represents a constitutional limitation on the
scheme of power-sharing between the governing bodies of Member States
and the institutions of the EC.' Rather than creating a division among
respective powers of the EU and the individual Member States,
subsidiarity creates a presumption of deference to state or local govern-
ment decision making in those areas of concurrent jurisdiction. In its
n TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [TEU] 1992 O.J. (C224) 1.
23 Id.
24 Id. at art. B.
' EC TREATY art. A, (as amended 1992).
26 Id. at art. 3B.
' For example, TEU art. G (amending EC Treaty art. 127) assures that the
Community, while supplementing vocational training policies, will "fully respect [ ] the
responsibility of the Member States for the content and organization of vocational
training." EC TREATY art. 127(1) (as amended 1992). Similar amendments to the EC
Treaty are effected by the TEU for other new subjects brought under the EU jurisdic-
tion, including consumer protection, culture, education, health and industrial competitive-
ness.
"' George A. Bermann, Subsidiarily and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoME'. L. REv. 97, 98 (1993) [hereinafter Bermann, Subsidiarity and The
European Community].
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application, the subsidiarity principle urges the European Council of
Ministers (Council), the European Parliament (Parliament), and the Euro-
pean Commission (Commission) to take actions pursuant to their consti-
tutional powers only when constituent Member States cannot adequately
achieve the desired results by acting alone or in conjunction with other
Member States.29
The subsidiarity principle thus expresses the aspiration that the
decision-making integrity of Member States over local affairs will be
preserved, and the institutions of the EC will be prevented from en-
croaching on areas more appropriately reserved for Member States.3" One
commentator has described subsidiarity as a principle of governance by
which actions to accomplish legitimate government objectives, ideally, are
taken at the lowest level of government capable of dealing with the
underlying problem.3 The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
defines subsidiarity "as a presumption that the European Union should do
only what states cannot do well themselves."3 While the subsidiarity
principle promotes strong, central political unity when necessary to
advance the desired ends of the collective policy, it also promotes the
advantageous benefits of localism whenever possible.33  Professor
Bermann concludes that the prime virtues of "localism" which subsidiarity
attempts to protect and advance include self-determination and account-
ability, political liberty, flexibility, preservation of local identities, diversi-
ty and respect for internal divisions of component states.34
Self-determination by local populations is preserved under
subsidiarity because rules and actions are being implemented at levels of
government where individuals are more involved and effectively repre-
sented.35 Likewise, accountability by local governments is preserved
because a local population's dissatisfaction with actions can be effectively
directed at the level of local government directly responsible for those
actions.36 The notions of state sovereignty and democratic home rule
under U.S. federalism incorporate the same policies of self-determination
and accountability.
Professor Weiler discusses the importance of subsidiarity to the
2 Id.
3 Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism" in the European Community and the United
States: A Rose By Any Other Name, 17 FORDHAM INT'. L.J. 389, 425 (1994).
31 Bermann, Subsidiarity and The European Community, supra note 28, at 97-98.
32 Figuring Out Subsidiarity, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1993, at 58.
3 Bermann, Subsidiarity and The European Community, supra note 28, at 98.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 340-44.
I d. at 340.
3 Id.
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European electorate in the context of preserving the virtues of self-deter-
mination, "legitimacy" and the democratic process.37 He states:
The legitimacy problem is generated by several factors, which should be
discussed separately. The primary factor is, at least arguably, that the
European electorate (in most Member States) only grudgingly accepts
the notion that crucial areas of public life should be governed by a
decisional process in which their national voice becomes a minority
which can be overridden by a majority of representatives from other
European countries. In theoretical terms there is, arguably, still no
legitimacy to the notion that the boundaries within which a minority will
accept as democratically legitimate a majority decision are now Europe-
an instead of national. 8
The second benefit of subsidiarity is political liberty. By promoting
the diffusion of power away from a central European government to the
many governing bodies of individual Member States, the risk of political
tyranny and oppression is lessened.39 Correspondingly, political liberty
and individual freedom are advanced. °
The third positive effect of subsidiarity is the flexibility of local
governments to respond more effectively and quickly to changes in
economic, social and other conditions within the local population. 1 This
in turn leads to a better system of government.42
The fourth virtue of subsidiarity is its preservation of local identities.
Through self-determination and political representation, local communities
can better protect their unique and distinctive cultures and mores.43
Additionally, through this preservation of local identities, diversity is fos-
tered throughout the political landscape." Thus, diversity is a fifth virtue
of subsidiarity.
The final virtue of subsidiarity in the EU is respect for the internal
divisions of Member States. The continuing concern of Member States
that the power of their governing bodies will be eroded by community
government cannot be underestimated.45 For example, in the late 1980's,
' J.H.H. Weiler, The Transfornation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403 (1991).
38 Id. at 2472-73 (emphasis in original).
'9 Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 341.
' Id. This same virtue of political liberty under the subsidiarity principle appears
in U.S. constitutional federalism as the separation of powers doctrine. See THE
FEDERAUST No. 45 (James Madison).
4' Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 341.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 341-42.
s See, e.g., VENABLEs & MARTIN, supra note 7, at 13 ("In line with [the principle
19951
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the German Lander criticized the EC institutions for interfering unneces-
sarily in the legislative rights conferred on them by the German Constitu-
tion." In response to this criticism by the German government, and by
the British as well, then Commission President Jacques Delors put
subsidiarity at the forefront of consideration in the future governance of
the EC.47 Fear of centralization continues to be a major concern of
Member States, and such fear has played a pivotal role in the historical
development of subsidiarity in Europe.48
Decisions by the European Court of Justice muddled the issues of
Member State sovereignty and Community law preemption, and spurred
the concern over protection of the virtues discussed previously.49 Many
of these cases required the same analysis as the U.S. Supreme Court
made in the early commerce clause cases regarding dormancy and pre-
emption of state law.
The above analysis is not intended to be a complete discussion of
the historical development of subsidiarity in the EU, but summarizes the
significance of the subsidiarity principle in the establishment of a scheme
of government between the Member States and the Community institu-
tions. In the same manner, the next section discusses the concept of
"federalism" in the U.S. and summarizes its historical development and
significance.
III. AMERICAN FEDERALISM COMPARED
A survey of constitutional history in the U.S. discloses a more or
less continuous debate on issues of federalism and states' rights, but no
counterpart for the European subsidiarity principle. The draftsmen of the
U.S. Constitution struggled mightily in 1787 between two opposing
theories. The so-called "nationalists" argued for a strong central govern-
ment that would have powers superior, in virtually all respects, to those
of the states.5" The proponents of limited government in a federal system
were more satisfied with the existing Articles of Confederation.5' Howev-
of subsidiarity]. Member States express the clear wish in the [TEU] that whilst
competence is extended to new areas, definite limits are set on the scope and type of
action which can be undertaken by the Community.").
" The Subsidiarity Principle, supra note 9, at 182.
47 Id.
4' See JosEPHNE STEINER, EEC LAW 3-6 (1988).
' See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
5 JOHN H. FERGUSON & DEAN E. MCHENRY, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 60 (10th ed. 1969).
" The Articles of Confederation were drafted in 1776-77 and were ratified in 1781.
[Vol. 27:061
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er, all of those involved in the Constitutional Convention recognized that
the original Articles of Confederation had not worked very well due to
the lack of authority for the central government to act decisively on criti-
cal issues.52
The new Constitution which resulted from that debate has been
called a "bundle of compromises,"" but it nevertheless established a
strong central government while reserving authority to the individual
states.M The first ten amendments were proposed by Congress on
September 25, 1789, and ratification was completed two years later on
December 15, 1791. A key provision in the U.S. Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment, provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or the people."
The proponents of state sovereignty and states' rights theories have
emphasized throughout the history of the U.S. the ambiguities in the
distribution of national and state powers. The arguments opposing a
strong federal government reached their height during the period between
the Constitution's ratification and the commencement of the Civil War of
1860-1865. The ultimate claim of states' rights advocates during that
contest was the right to secede from the Union, a claim which was
interred when the Civil War concluded in favor of the Union. However,
the notions of state sovereignty and states' rights continued to receive
judicial support in other respects until 1937. From that time until the
early 1970s, when they were revitalized by conservative Supreme Court
justices, state sovereignty and states' rights had little vitality.
The states' rights argument which flows from the ambiguities of the
Tenth Amendment is founded upon the following analysis: As a result of
the successful American Revolution in 1776, the sovereignty of the
British Crown over North America was transferred to the victorious
individual states." Thereafter, the states could act as independent nation-
I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 79-137
(Merrill Jenson ed., 1976).
2 For a comprehensive summary of federalism and states' rights in the U.S., see
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 278-287, 830-835 (Kermit L. Hall,
ed., 1992).
53 See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 50, at 61; JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS ET AL.,
GOvERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 38 (9th ed. 1975).
' FERGUSON, supra note 50, at 61-65. See also MAX. J. SKIDMORE & MARSHALL
CARTER WANKE, AMERICAN GOvERNMENT, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 15-17, 21-22 (3d
ed. 1981).
" An exception was the power over foreign affairs which went directly from Great
Britain to the United States. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
1995]
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states, except to the extent that they voluntarily and collectively vested
exclusive power in a central government.
The notions of state sovereignty and states' rights often have been
represented by using a geometric metaphor; there are "two separate
spheres of dual sovereignty," one federal, and the other state. Since each
is sovereign, each is supreme in its sphere and the powers are mutually
exclusive. However, it is recognized that they share concurrent powers, so
that both the federal government and the state government can regulate
the same area. 6
Some of the early decisions of the Supreme Court provided the
foundations for a strong central government. The modem interpretation of
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was provided by the
Supreme Court decision in the case of United States v. Darby,57 in
which the Court stated:
The [Tenth] Amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption
to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution before the Amendment or that its purpose was other than
to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise
fully their reserved powers."
The Court's decision in Darby vanquished the view that an otherwise
valid exercise of a delegated or implied power by the federal government
could be blocked by the states under the Tenth Amendment.
The fact that the Constitutional draftsmen had omitted the word
"expressly" in the Tenth Amendment is very significant because it
showed that the object of the amendment was not to interfere with or
restrict any of the powers delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution, whether expressly delegated or not.
304, 316 (1936).
' See generally FERGUSON, supra note 50, at 90 ("All governmental power cannot
be classified into Federal or state categories. Some powers are shared by the two levels
of government; these are usually called 'concurrent powers'.").
s United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940). Four years earlier, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Butler had invalidated federal attempts to regulate agriculture,
despite the fact that agriculture had been found to be within the spending power
delegated to Congress for the general welfare. Federal legislation was found to be in
excess of congressional power because agriculture traditionally had been regulated by
the states. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1935).
58 Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
[Vol. 27:061
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The view of federal supremacy articulated in the Darby decision was
briefly modified in 1976 in the Supreme Court's decision in the case of
National League of Cities v. Usery.59 The Court applied the Tenth
Amendment to prevent the application of the Federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act' to state and local government employees. The Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act, which had been applied to the states, was enacted
in 1938 to provide a minimum fair wage' and to encourage employers
to hire additional employees to relieve the economic pressures of the
Great Depression. However, the Usery decision held that the Tenth
Amendment prevented the application of the minimum wage law to state
and local government employees under the doctrines of state sovereignty
and dual federalism.62
Rather than protecting state interests totally from interference by
federal regulation, the Usery decision was limited to preventing federal
regulation of "functions essential to separate and independent [state]
existence."63 In this particular case, the functions in question were the
"power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they
employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours
those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where
these employees may be called upon to work overtime. '
Although many viewed the Usery decision as revitalizing the notion
of dual federalism, its impact lasted for just over nine years. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority' overruled Usery. The Court concluded that it was impossible
to discriminate between a "traditional governmental function," protected
under Usery by the Tenth Amendment, from a "nontraditional" function
which would not be protected.'
In Garcia, the Court recognized that the states continue to occupy a
"special and specific position in our constitutional system and that the
scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect
that position."'67 However, the Court clarified its intention by stating that
any such limitations were basically to be found within the political
" National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
60 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
61 BURNS, supra note 53, at 627.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
63 Id.
'Id.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
6 See id. at 540-541.
6 Id. at 556.
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process "through state participation in federal governmental action."'
The decision did not speculate about what limits, if any, the Constitution
might impose on the states' participation.
Advocates of strong central government could view the Garcia
decision as an implicit recognition that each state is represented in Con-
gress and thereby can use the political process to prevent, or at least
attempt to prevent, unwelcome federal involvement in state activity.
In recent years, there has been increasing concern that the U.S. is
overregulated by Congress. Many commentators are wondering whether
Congress is the most efficient regulator in some of the areas into which
it has intruded, or whether it would be more efficient to allow the states
to regulate according to their individual perceptions of local priorities and
policies. Many of the disputes concerning who should regulate arise when
Congress attempts to regulate local behavior by using its power provided
under the Commerce Clause.
Judicial construction of the Commerce Clause theoretically could lead
to the adoption of the subsidiarity principle. However, a review of the
historical treatment of Commerce Clause power reveals that the courts
have shown little inclination to impose upon Congress any obligation to
defer to the states.
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution lists the various powers delegated
by the people to Congress. Certain of those powers, such as the power to
"declare War . . . To raise and support armies . . . To provide and
maintain a navy . . . ." rarely are coveted by the states and it is generally
conceded that it is best to leave those responsibilities to a strong central
government. However, with respect to certain other powers, frequent op-
portunities for conflict exist between the federal government and the
states.
Among other things, Section 8 provides that: "the Congress shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, impose and excises ...
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states . . . ." The Federal Government frequently uses its "commerce
power" as the basis for the enactment of federal legislation. Much of the
controversy concerning federal congressional overreach is centered upon
Congress' use of its "commerce power."
Early decisions of the Supreme Court dealt with the limits of the
Commerce Clause. In 1824, the Court held in Gibbons v. Ogden' that
congressional power over interstate commerce is "complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
6 Id.
6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1 Wheat.).
[Vol. 27:061
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than are prescribed in the Constitution."'7 Although Gibbons was one of
the first decisions to take an expansive view of federal authority under
the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Marshall nevertheless recognized that
there were limits on congressional power. He noted that as comprehensive
as the commerce power was, it was "restricted to that commerce which
concerns more states than one."'7
While granting considerable latitude to Congress, the Court did
articulate some limitations on congressional reach. However, none rose to
the level of imposing a principle of deference to state and local authori-
ties, as contemplated by the subsidiarity principle. In Wickard v.
Filburn, ' the Supreme Court stated that:
[Elven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
73
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the scope of judicial
review of congressional actions under the Commerce Clause is very
narrow: "The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such
finding."'74 While such expansive readings by the Supreme Court of
congressional power would seem to be conclusive, the debate over federal
encroachments on states' rights continues to this day, no doubt exacerbat-
ed by the legislative ambitions of Congress.
Recent Supreme Court opinions authored by Justice O'Connor may
represent growing judicial impatience with pervasive regulation by Con-
gress. In Gregory v. Ashcrof,7 the Court interpreted the Tenth Amend-
ment to require a rule of statutory interpretation which it labeled the
70 Id. at 196.
7I Id. at 194
n Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
I d. at 125 (emphasis added).
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (emphasis added). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1936). This was
further clarified in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz,
in which the Court stated: "Neither here nor in Wickard has the court declared that
Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on Congress as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196
(1968).
' Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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"plain statement rule," cautioning courts to be "absolutely certain that
Congress intended" to intrude in state powers.76
In its subsequent decision in the case of New York v. United
States,77 in which Justice O'Connor again authored the majority opinion,
the Court found a provision of the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 198578 to be constitutionally invalid. The Act es-
sentially requires the states to make the choice of either accepting own-
ership of radioactive wastes generated within their jurisdiction, or to
regulate such materials in accordance with federal standards.79 The Court
expressed concern that Congress was attempting to "commandeer" the
states' ability to regulate such issues within their borders, and thereby
impose upon the states financial obligations for implementing policies
established by the federal government."
Despite the significance of both Gregory v. Ashcroft and New York
v. United States, the Court did not adopt a subsidiarity principle in those
decisions. However, to the extent that the decisions ensure that the federal
government will bear the financial burdens of implementing new federal
policies, they clearly do provide a source of encouragement for Congress
to consider carefully whether the states can better regulate a particular
area without federal intervention. In the final analysis, the Tenth Amend-
ment was not designed for, nor has it been interpreted to ensure, the
establishment of a broad policy of deference to state and local authorities
in areas where the federal government shares regulatory power.
Two recent decisions in the lower federal courts illustrate the nature
of this controversy in contemporary litigation. On October 19, 1993, the
U.S. Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued its
decision in the case of United States v. Cortner,s' a criminal action in
which the defendant filed a motion to dismiss as unconstitutional a charge
that he had violated the federal Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992.82 Federal
76 id. at 464.
" New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
78 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d) (1988).
79 New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2428-9.
' Id. at 2420. Justice White dissented on the grounds that the Court was not
following the Garcia decision. Id. at 2443 (White, J., dissenting). The rationale of New
York v. United States was subsequently applied in Board of Natural Resources of Wash.
v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993).
SI United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd, U.S. v.
Osteen and Cortner, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19221 (6th Cir. July 26, 1994) (petition
for cert. filed, Oct. 24, 1994).
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp V. 1993); § 101 of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992,
H.R. 4542, 102 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2834.
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District Court Judge Wiseman sustained the motion, finding that the Act
lacked "any rational nexus to interstate commerce," and that Congress
therefore lacked the power to legislate "carijacking" penalties under the
Commerce Clause." The court noted that the facts established a "pure
case of intrastate automobile theft at gunpoint.""
Judge Wiseman stated that his decision was consistent with the
established standard of review for Commerce Clause cases, and found the
federal statute to be in excess of congressional powers because it only
involved intrastate theft, therefore failing to raise a federal issue. 5 Judge
Wiseman articulated his concern about congressional overreach:
The Congress has had a recent penchant for passing a federal criminal
statute on any well-publicized criminal activity. The courts, in an obei-
sant deference to the legislative branch, have stretched the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution beyond the wildest imagination of the framers
and beyond any rational interpretation of the language itself. At every
meeting of federal judges that I attend there is the complaint that the
Congress is broadening federal jurisdiction to the point where we are
unable to do our jobs. The historically unique and discrete jurisdiction
of the federal courts is being distorted. The constant lament is that the
constitutional concept of Federalism is being eviscerated by the Con-
gress. The Congress is able to do this, however, only because we in the
judicial branch are willing to interpret the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution so broadly.'
Judge Wiseman proceeded to relate the historical view of state versus
federal powers, as stated by the Supreme Court in Bell v. United States:
"It has been a widely held and historically accepted premise of our
governmental structure that law enforcement was primarily the business
of state and local governments and that we as a nation deplored the idea
of a national police force. '
Cortner, 834 F. Supp. at 244.
Id. at 242.
The Supreme Court has long adhered to the view that "a court may invalidate
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no
rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means
selected and the asserted ends." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981)
(emphasis added).
' Cortner, 834 F. Supp. at 244. One of the possible reasons for the proliferation
of federal law and law enforcement agencies is the pervasive national problem of
unlawful drug traffic and use.
Id. at 244 (quoting Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 363-66 (1983) (Stevens,
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Upon review, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded Cortner.88 The court explained:
It may well be that the carjacking statute is unwise and encroaches on
traditional views of federalism, as Judge Wiseman observes in United
States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), but it is not
unconstitutional under current Commerce Clause doctrine. So long as the
activity regulated has an effect on interstate commerce it makes no
difference that the transported item is not "at rest" and is no longer "in"
interstate commerce.89
The Sixth Circuit concluded that it was "obvious that carjackings as
a category of criminal activity have an effect on interstate travel and the
travel of foreign citizens to this country."'
Other federal judges, including some at the appellate court level,
nevertheless have shared Judge Wiseman's concerns. For example, in
United States v. Lopez,9' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the defendant's conviction under the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 for possession of a firearm in a school zone.92 The
Act makes it unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm
in a school zone, and even makes it a federal crime to carry an unloaded
firearm in an unlocked suitcase on a public sidewalk in front of one's
residence, so long as that part of the sidewalk is within 1,000 feet of the
boundary of the school bounds of any public or private school, regardless
of whether it is during the school year or whether the school is actually
in session.93
In the opinion written by Judge Garwood, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and held that: (1) The Gun-Free School
Zones Act was invalid because it was beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause,' and (2) even if the conviction might have
been upheld had the government alleged and proved that the offense had
a nexus to interstate commerce, the defendant still would be entitled to
reversal of the conviction because the indictment did not allege any
J., dissenting)).
" United States v. Osteen and Cortner, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19221 (6th Cir. July
26, 1994) (petition for cert. filed, Oct. 24, 1994).
89 Id.
Id. at 4 (quoting U.S. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 109 (6th Cir. 1994)).
9' United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct.
1536 (April 18, 1994).
92 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (Supp. V. 1993).
9' See id. §§ 922(q)(1), 921(a)(25)-(26).
9' Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68.
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connection to interstate commerce.95
The court began its analysis with reference to James Madison's
comments in The Federalist Papers: "he powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefi-
nite."96 The court noted that Madison's understanding of the federal
government's powers was confirmed by the Tenth Amendment.
The court also observed that the notion of dual sovereignty shared
by the states and the federal government was relevant because the instant
case "pits the states' traditional authority over education and schooling
against the federal government's acknowledged power to regulate firearms
in or affecting interstate commerce."'97
The court noted that "[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of
that power to the states."" However, if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power
the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. Therefore, even if the
Gun-Free School Zones Act intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to
the states, it is constitutional so long as it falls within the commerce
power delegated to Congress.
After an extensive historical review of other congressional exercises
of power over the regulation of firearms, the court concluded that in this
particular case, there was no rational basis for the exercise of the com-
merce power by Congress. "Broad as the commerce power is, its scope
is not unlimited, particularly where intrastate activities are concerned.""
The court in Lopez concluded that Congress had overstepped its powers
in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because the regulated
activity did not substantially affect intrastate commerce." The Lopez
case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in late November,
1994.'0'
The Cortner and Lopez decisions are illustrative of the growing
dissatisfaction among the federal judiciary with the expansive exercise of
congressional powers under the Commerce Clause. In some cases, this
9' Id. at 1368.
9 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 40, at 292.
' Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1346.
9' Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992)).
'9 Id. at 1361.1o See id. at 1363-68.
101 See U.S. v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 3419 (Nov. 29, 1994) (stating that U.S. v. Lopez
oral arguments were heard on November 8, 1994). See also Harvey Berkman,
Congress' Reach May Be Nipped, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1994, at A6.
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may not amount to very much more than judicial grumbling about the
increased work load of federal courts. There has been no Supreme Court
decision in the last fifty years setting aside a finding by Congress in
support of legislation based upon the Commerce Clause on the grounds
that such finding was without a rational basis. It therefore appears that if
Congress does articulate formal findings when it passes such legislation
to show why it considers the matter to be subject to its regulatory power
under the Commerce Clause, it is unlikely that the courts would view
such a finding as "irrational." It should be noted that in Lopez, the
legislation was set aside because Congress failed to make any such
findings establishing the necessary connection with interstate commerce.
Many federal courts take a different approach and no longer bother
to even insist on such findings. In another case arising in California, the
police arrested the defendant in a Sacramento high school parking lot
upon finding two rifles in the trunk of his car."°2 When he was prose-
cuted under the federal Gun Free School Zones Act, he used the same
defense that proved successful in the Lopez case.
In reaching a conclusion that was exactly opposite to that of the
Fifth Circuit, Judge Alarcan of the Ninth Circuit stated that Congress long
ago had made findings that firearms move in interstate commerce, and it
was not necessary to repeat such findings each time it legislates on the
subject. The opinion further stated that Congress is entitled to "highly
deferential" treatment when it legislates under the Commerce Clause."
The notion of federalism in the U.S. has traveled a long and tortuous
path and those who favor strong central government clearly have won
significant victories. However, the tendency of the central government,
through the legislative branch, to overregulate continues to cause concern
and dissension among the states and the judiciary. One can expect that
this process of constant adjustment and readjustment will continue unabat-
ed, despite the fact that America's version of federalism has long envi-
sioned a strong central government.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE:
DANGERS OF "CREEPING FEDERALISM"
To the extent that American federalism is a useful guide, it suggests
that the contagion of "creeping federalism" could spread in the EU and
result in pervasive control of local affairs by the central European govern-
ment. Because confusion persists in the EU about the meaning of
"0. United States v. Edwards, 13 F. 3d 291, 292 (9th Cir. 1994).
'03 Id. at 294.
104 Id. at 293.
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subsidiarity and its real significance in stemming the growth of central
control, the subsidiarity principle may not adequately protect against
encroachment upon state powers by the central European government."
Upon review of European descriptions of subsidiarity, one cannot avoid
being struck by the high level of abstraction in attempts to define the
principle."° Until consensus is reached on the meaning of subsidiarity,
and it is effectively internalized and assimilated in the government struc-
ture, the danger of "creeping federalism" remains very real for the EU.
Indeed, evidence of this phenomenon already appears in the pervasive
central European government control of certain programs in apparent
disregard of the subsidiarity principle.
One example of the general inclination toward federalism of local
issues in the EU is the common agricultural policy (CAP), which ac-
counts for over half of the EU's budget. 7 Yet it is said that farming
results in few international externalities, so there is no economic reason
for the EU to be so pervasively involved in agricultural policy and
regulation. Thus, it may be argued, agricultural policy is an area which
should be left for the individual Member States to regulate."' A lack of
uniform application and consensus on the meaning of subsidiarity allows
such a triumph of federal control.
This is not to suggest that all centralization of governmental power
is necessarily undesirable. In fact, the presence of externalities which
cross borders might require the presence of pervasive government control.
For example, Professors Schemmel and de Regt argue that the principle
of subsidiarity should not result in a shift of power from EU institutions
in the implementation of environmental legislation."° They assert that
"because problems of environmental protection are largely transboundary
in nature (pollution does not recognize a nation's sovereign border), there
10 Former Prime Minister Thatcher was known to describe the term "subsidiarity"
as "gobbledegook." See, e.g., Philip Howard, Column, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 15,
1992, at 16.
" Professor Bermann has observed that, "[a] particular problem with subsidiarity,
however, is that it tends more to describe an abstract goal than a method of achieving
it." Bermann, Subsidiarity and The European Community, supra note 28, at 103.
'o' Figuring out Subsidiarity, supra note 32, at 58.
'I Id. Nevertheless, there have been recent calls for massive CAP reform, triggered
in part by GATT negotiations and tremendous inefficiencies within the agricultural
bureaucracy, which could be minimized by application of the subsidiarity principle. See
Lionel Barber, Report Sends Tremors Through Brussels, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at
30.
Matthew L. Schemmel & Bas de Regt, The European Court of Justice and the
Environmental Protection Policy of the European Community, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 53, 80 (1994).
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are compelling reasons for developing environmental protection policies
primarily at the Community level."" Yet some aspects of environmen-
tal legislation may not require central control, such as the prescription of
minimum standards of drinking water which the EU has established since
1980."'
In drawing comparisons between the U.S. experience with federalism
and the developing European experience with federalism governed by
subsidiarity, Professor Fischer aptly points out that subsidiarity is a two-
edged sword which can cut against Community action, but also can cut
against state action."2 The analysis of subsidiarity will be much like the
analysis of congressional power over commerce among the several
states."3 The U.S. Supreme Court is the final arbiter of congressional
regulations under the Commerce Clause, and the resolution of subsidiarity
issues will depend on the European Court rather than the courts of the
individual Member States. Professor Hartley observes:
In practice, it will almost always be possible to formulate the objectives
of [a] measure in different ways. In defending the measure, the Com-
mission and the Council will argue for a formulation which requires
Community action. One can even expect that the preamble and wording
of the measure will be drafted so as to facilitate this.
In such a situation, everything will depend on the European Court. It
will decide whether the measure falls within an area in which the Com-
munity has exclusive jurisdiction; it will formulate the objectives of the
measure, and it will decide whether they can be better achieved by
Community action. All these questions involve so many imponderables
that it will almost always be possible for the Court, if it wishes, to find
grounds for upholding the measure. As a result, the effectiveness of
subsidiarity will depend, to a considerable extent, on the attitude and
policy of the European Court."4
Thus, despite the supposed promotion of the subsidiarity principle as
a guideline to restrict EU action, substantial potential appears to exist for
"creeping federalism" to evolve in the EU, as it has in the U.S., despite
110 Id.
" Figuring out Subsidiarity, supra note 32, at 58. The article points out that "the
quality of a Dane's drinking-water has no effect on the quality of a Spaniard's drinking
water." Id.
2 Fischer, supra note 30, at 435.
" Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
, Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 217 (1993).
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the constitutional limitations on the power of the federal government."5
One of the challenges for the EU in the near future will be how to
put subsidiarity into practice and turn it into a meaningful concept. Other-
wise, the triumph of federalism over local interests may continue in all
areas of concern, resulting in pervasive central government control. This
in turn will cause additional strife among the EU with countries such as
Denmark and Great Britain, who are adamantly opposed to strong central
government control by the EU.
The answers to such problems in the U.S. lie in the political process,
apparently as intended by the original framers of the Constitution. Wheth-
er as a result of lobbying efforts by state and local governments and their
supporting organizations, or by the voting preferences of the citizenry,
Congress theoretically is restrained from excessive intervention in state
and local matters. 6 As has been suggested, however, theory and prac-
tice often have been at variance in this regard. The November 1994
elections appeared to send to Congress a message of widespread voter
disaffection with the federal government. One can attribute the current
raging at incumbent politicians not only to a reaction against excessive
congressional intervention in state and local affairs, but also to dissat-
isfaction with excessive government intervention at any level, regardless
of whether the intervenor is federal, state or local.
"s Professor Bermann notes that:
[R]ecent years, however, have witnessed growing concern over the impact of federal
legislation and regulation on the fabric of U.S. federalism. Some commentators have
taken to complaining of the "uncritical acceptance in many quarters of the notion that
the federal government is the best level of government at which to establish regulatory
programs."
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 14, at 405.
In view of these concerns, Professor Bermann offers several suggestions on how
to effectively put the subsidiarity principle into practice in the EU to prevent such
uncritical acceptance" of pervasive central government control. Id.
"' See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).

